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ANTI-COMMUNIST RESISTANCE POTENTIAL IN THE SINO-SOVIET BLOC

Submitted by the

DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE

The following intelligence organizations participated in the preparation of this estimate: The Central Intelligence Agency and the intelligence organizations of the Departments of State, the Army, the Navy, the Air Force, and The Joint Staff.

Concurred in by the

INTELLIGENCE ADVISORY COMMITTEE

on 12 April 1955. Concurring were the Special Assistant, Intelligence, Department of State; the Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2, Department of the Army; the Director of Naval Intelligence; the Director of Intelligence, USAF; and the Deputy Director for Intelligence, The Joint Staff. The Atomic Energy Commission Representative to the IAC, and the Assistant to the Director, Federal Bureau of Investigation, abstained, the subject being outside of their jurisdiction. The Annexes to the Estimate (pages 6-31) were coordinated among the IAC Agencies.

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ANTI-COMMUNIST RESISTANCE POTENTIAL IN THE SINO-SOVIET BLOC

THE PROBLEM

To appraise the intensity and scope of dissidence and resistance in Sino-Soviet Bloc countries, and to estimate the resistance potential under cold and hot war conditions in the Bloc.[1]

INTRODUCTORY NOTE

In estimating the resistance potential of a people in relation to their government, it is necessary to know the nature, extent, and depth of their discontent, the strength of their will to resist, and their capability for resistance compared with the will and capability of the regime to maintain control.

In a Communist-ruled country the best known of these factors is the regime's intention to preserve internal security regardless of cost; its capability of forestalling effective resistance; and its constant pressure to induce the individual to adjust himself to the Communist environment.

Lacking any legal avenues for expressing dissent, the population still can indicate its discontent through a variety of actions and inactions unfavorable to the regime, ranging from individual actions to widespread opposition. These types of resistance are symptomatic of discontent, but do not necessarily reveal the extent, constancy, and specific causes of underlying discontent. The will to resist, the skill in doing so, the motivation, and the opportunities, vary from element to element in the population, and from time to time.

In this estimate, the following terminology is used to describe these types of action:

1. *Dissidence* is a state of mind involving discontent or disaffection with the regime.

2. *Resistance* is dissidence translated into action.

3. *Organized resistance* is that which is carried out by a group of individuals who have accepted a common purpose, agreed

[1] This estimate covers resistance potential in entire Sino-Soviet Bloc. More detailed coverage of individual Bloc countries is set forth in the attached Annexes on Albania, Bulgaria, Czechoslovakia, East Germany, Hungary, Rumania, the USSR, North Korea, and North Vietnam. Poland and Communist China are considered in the over-all estimate, but no annexes are included on these countries. For more detailed treatment of these two countries see RIR–1, "Anti-Communist Resistance Activities and Potential in Poland," dated 20 July 1954, and RIR–2, "Anti-Communist Resistance Activities and Potential in China," dated 2 November 1954.

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on leadership, and worked out a communications system.

4. *Unorganized resistance* is that which is carried out by individuals or loosely associated groups which may have been formed spontaneously for certain limited objectives, without over-all plan or strategy.

5. *Active resistance,* organized or unorganized, is that which expresses itself in positive acts against the regime. It may take such forms as intelligence collection, psychological warfare, sabotage, guerrilla warfare, assistance in escape and evasion, open defiance of authority, or preparatory activity for any of the above. It may or may not involve violence, and may be conducted openly or clandestinely.

6. *Passive resistance,* organized or unorganized, is that which is conducted within the framework of the resister's normal life and duties, and involves deliberate nonperformance or malperformance of acts which would benefit the regime, or deliberate nonconformity with standards of conduct established by the regime.

ESTIMATE

1. There is evidence of widespread dissidence in all Communist Bloc countries. While in general dissidence is greatest among the peasantry, even the youth and industrial workers, two groups which might be expected to be most favorable to Communist indoctrination, have become increasingly disaffected in the European Satellites and to a lesser extent in the USSR.

2. However, the intensity of dissidence varies considerably. It is probably least pronounced in the USSR, where Communism has become more firmly established. In the Far East Bloc areas, where Communism is exploiting the new surge of nationalism, dissidence almost certainly is much less strong than in the East European Satellites, where national interests are being subordinated to those of the USSR.

3. Despite the existence of dissidence throughout the Bloc, active organized resistance is practically nonexistent. A few isolated small guerrilla bands may still be operating in some Satellites, notably in Albania, but they are no more than a local nuisance which probably will be wiped out sooner or later by the security forces.

4. Even though dissidence within the Sino-Soviet Bloc creates a resistance potential, we believe that under continued cold war conditions active resistance is unlikely to develop. There may be a few isolated acts of unorganized resistance, but the effectiveness of Communist security controls and police state methods will probably remain such as to make active organized resistance virtually impossible, except in a few almost inaccessible areas. Therefore, even in countries where dissidence is strongest, such as East Germany, we see no prospect of resistance activities developing on a scale sufficient to threaten the stability of the regimes. At a maximum such activities will tend to delay the achievement of Communist political and economic objectives. At a minimum they will constitute a nuisance

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to the regimes and will raise the morale of anti-Communist elements. Increased active resistance would be likely only if the Communist security apparatus were greatly weakened, or if Sino-Soviet power and prestige were greatly decreased.

5. On the other hand, a substantial degree of passive resistance is likely to continue. Such resistance is unlikely seriously to threaten the political stability of the Communist regimes. However, particularly in agriculture, it will probably remain a troublesome and even serious factor throughout the Bloc countries, impeding the fulfillment of their political and economic programs. Nevertheless, we believe that the persistent pressures exercised by Communist regimes will eventually reduce the extent of even passive resistance and will almost certainly prevent the emergence of coordinated resistance activities.

6. In most of the USSR and to a lesser extent in Communist China, the outbreak of open warfare would stimulate patriotic feelings in support of the regimes. Widespread destruction or protracted hostilities, however, might lead to the emergence of resistance. In the newly acquired areas of the USSR, such as the Baltic States and the Western Ukraine, hopes of liberation would be rekindled at the outset, intensifying the resistance potential. In the European Satellites, the outbreak of war would not only stimulate hopes for liberation but would also increase popular unrest and passive resistance. We believe, however, that no active organized resistance would occur, unless the Bloc suffered severe military setbacks, and Western forces approached Satellite territory. Communist military and security forces would almost certainly remain sufficiently strong to prevent or check outbreaks. However, we estimate that major resistance movements in the Bloc, comparable to those of World War II, probably would not develop in areas still under Communist control until the local security organizations had been seriously weakened and the USSR and Communist China were unable to enforce order in their respective orbits. Until such circumstances arose, activities of resistance elements would probably be confined to intelligence collection and transmission, surreptitious antiregime propaganda, aid to Western personnel in escape and evasion operations, and defection inducements.

7. In many countries of the non-Communist world there are organizations, composed of and led by persons who have emigrated from countries of the Soviet Bloc. In general these organizations have lost effective contact with their homelands and do not significantly contribute to resistance potential. Virtually all have suffered from internal bickering and lack of funds and have been penetrated by agents of Communist security forces. The people within the Bloc know very little about emigre organizations. With rare exceptions they would almost certainly not welcome leading emigres in positions of power after liberation.

8. In the event of war, the nationality of invading forces probably would in general have little bearing on the cooperation offered by resistance elements in the Sino-Soviet Bloc, provided these forces were clearly integrated in a broad anti-Communist military organization. In certain situations, however, long-stand-

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ing national antipathies might outweigh anti-Communist feelings. Thus, anti-Communist resistance activities might be adversely affected by the prominent use of: (a) German forces in Czechoslovakia, Poland, and the USSR; (b) Yugoslav, Greek, and Turkish units in Bulgaria; (c) Greek, Italian, or Yugoslav units in Albania; and (d) Japanese forces in North Korea and Communist China.

9. The question of responsibility for the initiation of general war would probably not substantially affect the will to resist the regimes in the Bloc countries.[2]

[2] The Special Assistant, Intelligence, Department of State, would substitute for this paragraph the following:

The question of responsibility for the initiation of general war will not affect the will to resist in the European Satellites, whose populations are so overwhelmingly against the existing regime as to be unaffected by considerations of war guilt. It will probably have more significance in the USSR, where support for the regime by the war-weary population would be decreased or increased by popular judgments as to the aggressive or defensive character of the war.

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ANNEX A: ALBANIA

BASIC CAUSES OF DISSIDENCE

1. The widespread popular dissidence in Albania springs from political, social, cultural, and religious as well as economic causes. The ruthless efforts of the Communist regime to destroy individual freedoms, patriarchal family patterns, village autonomy, and religion are particularly resented. For many centuries, opposition to central authority has been an Albanian tradition. Local patriotism and rugged individualism have combined to create opposition to all authority, alien or native, beyond the confines of the immediate tribes or villages. This trait is particularly pronounced in the northern areas predominantly inhabited by the Ghegs, mountain tribes who until World War I had little contact with the modern world. The more accessible southern tribes, the Tosks, have been in closer touch with new ideas and modern techniques, and the Tosk intellectuals were the first to become interested in Marxism.

2. Moreover, the present Communist regime is identified with the traditionally hated Slavs. Ever since the Slavs drove the Albanians back into the mountainous edges of the Adriatic, the Albanians have been anti-Slav. The massacre of Albanians by Serbs during the 1912 Balkan War aggravated this feeling. Thus Communism, particularly for the Ghegs, has the handicap of its Slavic association, all the more so since the Albania Communist Party was founded in 1941 by Yugoslav Communists who directed the movement until 1948 when Tito defected and Albanian Communist leader Hoxha cast his lot with the Cominform.

3. Another basic cause of dissidence is Communist interference with Albania's cultural heritage. After Albania became independent in 1912, a number of French, English, and Italian schools were created, young Albanians were sent to Western universities, and Western cultural influence grew considerably. The regime's attempt to enforce Soviet orientation has made Albania's few intellectuals pay perfunctory lip service to Communism but they remain strongly opposed to Soviet culture. The regime, apparently unable to change this situation, has frequently charged its teachers with still being "bourgeois," and having a "low ideological level." The Communist crusade against religion has further increased popular discontent not only because of interference in matters of belief but also because religion is regarded as a part of the national cultural heritage. Religious groups (Islamic, Greek Orthodox, and Roman Catholic) which played a major part in the country's cultural development have been brought under state control.

4. The present inadequate standard of living is a further cause of dissidence. Although living standards have always been low, the difference between pre- and post- Communist living conditions is great enough to evoke grumbling which is considerably enhanced by government economic measures such as quotas and forced loans.

MAJOR DISSIDENT ELEMENTS

5. Dissidence toward the regime appears strong among all classes. With the exception of the top governmental bureaucracy, the ranking officers in the army, the national and local Party leaders, and the security forces, there is no group — even within the Party — which derives real benefits from the regime. The suppression of elements considered incorrigible and their internment in forced labor camps has exacerbated the widespread ill-feeling toward the government. After 10 years of Communist rule approximately 10 percent of the population is still in jails and labor camps. Annual amnesties have not decreased the prison population which indicated that new "enemies of the people" have replaced those freed.

6. *The Peasantry.* Albania is a country of peasants, who comprise the largest and most formidable anti-Communist element. The

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principal reasons for peasant disaffection are crushing taxes, heavy obligatory delivery quotas for which the government pays low prices, seizure of livestock, imposition of "voluntary" (forced) labor and forced state loans, collectivization pressures and police terrorization. Mainly because of peasant opposition, only 16 percent of the arable land has so far been collectivized. Poor and landless peasants in the south and central areas initially profited by the so-called agrarian reforms of 1945–1956 but were quickly disillusioned. Individualistic and proud of their past independence, the peasants are indifferent to and care less for Communist ideology. The intense peasant antagonism against Communist policies largely accounts for lack of reliability of the armed forces and industrial labor, both of which groups are recruited chiefly from the peasantry.

7. *Youth.* Albanian youth, both rural and urban, had joined the liberation movements against the Italian and German occupation, and the Communists, camouflaging themselves in the National Liberation Front, succeeded for a period in attracting large numbers of youth. However, by 1950 Communist propaganda had become ineffective because of economic inequalities, "voluntary" labor, imposition of a foreign ideology, and economic want.

8. *Military.* The rank and file of the Albanian Army cannot be considered loyal to the regime. One indication is the fact that units of the army have never been used to stamp out guerrilla activities. Fanatical Communist security police were used instead. Only the security police, some noncommissioned officers, and ranking army officers who rose to their present position during the wartime partisan warfare or under the Communist regime are considered reliable. These groups, and the network of informers placed in every village, are the security backbone of the Albanian regime, and have prevented anti-Communist bands from overthrowing the Tirana government by force.

9. *Intelligentsia and Clergy.* Intellectuals and clergymen represent a considerable resistance leadership potential. Most of the Albanian intelligentsia fought the rise of Communism during the war. *Balli Kombetar* (National Front), the strongest anti-Communist nationalist organization during World War II, was founded by intellectual democratic elements. Many of the intelligentsia were exiled, executed, or jailed after the Communists came to power. Of the intellectuals remaining in Albania, only a few can be trusted by the government. The clergy, particularly the Roman Catholics, also hate the regime. While Moslem and Orthodox priests appear to have been cowed, the regime can probably not rely on them.

INTENSITY OF RESISTANCE

10. There is evidence that Albanians have not lost the hope of eventual liberation, and isolated acts of overt resistance are still reported to occur. However, mounting police terror and brutality have decreased active resistance during the past five years. On the whole, the success of security forces in detecting and destroying guerrillas has greatly weakened the small, scattered, and uncoordinated guerrilla bands operating in mountain redoubts. Escape to Yugoslavia and Greece and passive resistance have become the primary expressions of opposition to the regime. Despite police surveillance, there is passive resistance in industry and agriculture such as obstructing the work of Soviet advisers, damaging machinery, producing goods of poor quality, hiding produce, and failing to meet farm quotas.

EMIGRE GROUPS

11. The situation in Albania differs from that in other Satellites in that much of the resistance activity that exists is directed by emigre groups in Greece, Yugoslavia, and Italy. There are four principal Albanian emigre groups in the West, the BK (Balli Kombetar), the Legality Movement (close to King Zog), a group of nonparty individuals, and the National Independent Bloc, whose leaders collaborated with Fascist Italy. The first three groups became affiliated in the National Committee for Free Albania (NCFA) in 1949. It gave the appearance of relative strength by combining most of the emigre groups and

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obtaining financial and moral support from the West. This Western support is the strongest unifying factor in the emigration. However, when in 1953 the National Independent Bloc and some other individuals were accepted in the NCFA, certain left-wing members of BK split off and formed the National Democratic Committee for a Free Albania (NDCFA).

12. There have been some contacts between resistance elements in Albania and the principal NCFA affiliates. Most resistance groups, particularly those reportedly operating in central and southern Albania, appear to have identified themselves with the NCFA. Although there is still much political and personal factionalism rending Albania emigre organizations, they appear to be in a relatively better shape and seem to have more contact with their homeland than the emigres of the other Satellites.

13. There is also a Yugoslav-sponsored League of Albanian Political Refugees in Yugoslavia, which has the advantage of being closer to Albania than other emigre elements. Its contacts with certain resistance elements in Albania, through Yugoslav intelligence service cross-border operations, have probably been closer and more numerous than those of the Western-oriented elements with the NCFA emigres. At one time, arms, supplies, and money reportedly were supplied to the underground by this group. However, due to Yugoslavia's normalization of relations with the Bloc powers, the group's activities have reportedly been sharply curtailed.

RESISTANCE POTENTIAL UNDER COLD WAR CONDITIONS

14. The few isolated resistance bands in Albania may continue for some time to occupy the attention of Communist security forces and inflict sporadic damage in the fields of communication and transportation. However, the regime's security measures make virtually impossible the organization of guerrilla warfare on a national, cohesive, and centrally directed scale. Any guerrilla forces would probably also be short of weapons and supplies. Thus, a gradual liquidation of these activities is likely. However, a substantial degree of passive resistance will probably continue to manifest itself.

RESISTANCE POTENTIAL UNDER WARTIME CONDITIONS

15. Because most Albanians are probably convinced that only an East-West war could bring them liberation, the outbreak of general war would almost certainly strengthen their resistance potential. At the very least, it would probably stiffen the hostility of the peasantry toward the regime. Both peasants and workers would probably try to sabotage the Communist war effort when they could do so without undue risk to themselves. Furthermore, the feasibility of at least covert help from Yugoslavia, Greece, and Italy, the geographic isolation of Albania from the Bloc, and the necessity for the regime to use all available manpower to secure its frontiers from attack or infiltration would probably make it easier in Albania than anywhere else in the Bloc for guerrillas to prepare organized resistance. It is likely that well led and equipped anti-regime Albanians could infiltrate the country from Yugoslavia or Greece.

16. Although large-scale uprisings probably would not occur immediately upon the outbreak of war, Albanian resistance elements, if supported from the outside, might be able to organize some active resistance. However, the commencement of *large-scale* guerrilla warfare would depend upon such developments as Western military successes, the weakening of the regime, the attitudes of Yugoslavia and Greece, and the ability of the West and the emigre groups to provide leadership and aid. Unless the USSR were able to reinforce Albania with Soviet units soon after the war broke out, a large-scale uprising could develop, particularly in the northern and central regions, before Western forces actually reached Albanian territory. Such a development would presuppose, however, that large numbers of Albanian conscripts escaped to the mountains, even though many of their officers remained loyal to the regime.

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ANNEX B: BULGARIA

BASIC CAUSES OF DISSIDENCE

1. Traditionally, through race, language, and culture the Bulgarians have been closely linked with the Russians. Prior to the Soviet occupation in September 1944, the majority of the population favored friendship with the USSR. But the conduct of the invading Soviet forces, the ruthless exploitation of Bulgarian resources by the USSR, and the relentless sovietization carried out by Communist puppets have quickly spread disillusionment and resentment. Bulgarians have long been used to political tyranny but the imposition of a system that made a mockery of their national sovereignty has alienated most Bulgarians. The regime's economic policies are regarded by most of the population as designed to further Soviet interests rather than those of Bulgaria. Extensive Soviet controls have made Bulgaria a virtual Soviet colony, but available evidence indicates that most Bulgarians are chafing under their Communist regime and loathe Soviet domination.

MAJOR DISSIDENT ELEMENTS

2. *The Peasantry.* The peasantry, some 80 percent of the population, constitutes the strongest opposition element. In the past, there were comparatively few landless peasants; most peasants owned a small tract of land which they tilled with the help of a cooperative system. They are bitterly opposed to collectivization. While the regime has maintained the facade of Alexander Stambolisky's Bulgarian National Agrarian Union, Communist collectivization policies have nullified this gesture. The regime's extremely unpopular methods of implementing Communist agricultural doctrine have aroused intense dissatisfaction on the part of most peasants.

3. *Industrial workers,* at one time the staunchest supporters of Communism, have shown increasing dissatisfaction with working conditions, totalitarian labor discipline, and inadequate wages. So far, the "new course" and the return to Bulgarian control of some Soviet-Bulgarian joint companies have had little effect on depressed living conditions. Industrial workers resent the extremely harsh labor laws which bind them to their jobs by penalty of imprisonment or confinement in a forced labor camp and permit mandatory transfers. Significantly, these laws have been created to prevent "unjustifiable absenteeism, growing labor turnover, and deteriorating labor discipline." Drastic measures are also being taken to prevent growing industrial sabotage.

4. *The clergy* has been subverted or intimidated with the help of the government-controlled "Union of Orthodox Priests" and other pro-Communist religious organizations. The formerly independent Bulgarian Orthodox Church, embracing nearly all Bulgarians, has been compelled to come under the Russian Patriarchate. The leadership of the small Catholic and Protestant communities has been virtually destroyed, and a large part of the Moslem minority deported to Turkey. The remaining non-Communist clergy is strongly opposed to the regime and constitutes a considerable resistance potential. Regime measures to discourage religious practices have also contributed to dissidence.

5. *Youth.* There is some evidence that a considerable number of Bulgarian youth may be gradually losing whatever initial enthusiasm it had for Communism. The restrictions and discipline imposed upon it by the Party are probably increasingly resented. The regime's irksome methods of indoctrination probably have caused many young people to resist Communist teachings and to look for liberation to the West. Evidence suggests that a significant number of university students are opposed to the regime. However, youth has little outlet for expressing its resentment.

6. *Military.* The majority of the officer corps is probably loyal to the regime. Most officers,

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since the purges of older elements, have obtained their rank through Communist influence and are not anxious to lose their privileges, even if they do not agree with the regime's policies. The enlisted personnel are recruited mainly from the peasantry, the strongest antiregime element, but the loyalty of the Bulgarian Army is probably somewhat higher than in the other Satellites. The close ethnic relationship of Bulgaria with Russia probably influences the attitude of the Army.

INTENSITY OF RESISTANCE

7. Although dissidence is strong in almost every segment of Bulgarian society, few Bulgarians have dared to defy the regime openly. The regime has been able to suppress active resistance and little opportunity for it exists. At present there is no evidence of organized resistance; acts of open resistance are few and reports describing them are often uncomfirmed. There have been two major purges of anti-Soviet elements: one broke up anti-Communist opposition between 1944 and 1947; the other, an internal party affair, took place after Tito's 1948 break with the Cominform and resulted in removal of those Bulgarian Communists who favored greater independence of the USSR.

8. On the other hand, some degree of passive resistance against the regime has continued in spite of the purges. Instances such as subtle economic sabotage by peasants and workers have occurred frequently, although they are, qualitatively and quantitatively, less than in most of the other Satellites. Peasants hide livestock and grain, secretly slaughter livestock, disregard sowing and plowing regulations, avoid planting maximum amounts of grain, and fail to make use of the machine tractor stations. Office and factory workers neglect maintenance of machinery, refuse to attend conferences and meetings, interpret government regulations with a strictness designed to show their absurdity, malinger, and practice absenteeism. Bulgarians who have the opportunity listen to Western broadcasts which the government is trying to jam. A few Bulgars continue to escape across the frontiers or defect abroad.

EMIGRE GROUPS

9. The few Bulgarian emigre groups are badly split and plagued by personal rivalries among the leaders. Until 1952, the Bulgarian National Committee was regarded as the most influential but without the support of the National Committee for Free Europe, its influence has waned. The most widely known emigre, former political leader G. M. Dimitrov, has been unable or unwilling to improve the situation. Despite extravagant claims of certain emigre leaders, there is no evidence that emigre elements have in any way guided or assisted organized or unorganized resistance within Bulgaria. Although present evidence indicates that Bulgarians still remember Dimitrov, it is difficult to determine how widespread his following may be.

RESISTANCE POTENTIAL UNDER COLD WAR CONDITIONS

10. In view of the regime's effective security controls, close Soviet supervision, and the absorption of Bulgaria into the Soviet security sphere, there is little likelihood that organized resistance can develop under cold war conditions. Isolated instances of unorganized active resistance will probably continue to occur, but without tangible outside help or a weakening of the Communist apparatus, they will probably diminish. The average Bulgarian is too engrossed in the daily struggle of living and too cowed by the police state to have time and energy left for resistance activities. At best, active resistance will be restricted to antiregime propaganda, some intelligence activity, and performing isolated acts of subtle sabotage, not necessarily recognizable as such. Cautious passive resistance will probably continue to be the only real outlet for disaffection. Since agriculture is the main-stay of the Bulgarian economy, peasant dissidence will continue to create major problems for the regime. However, if the "new course" is continued and produces tangible results, or if the Bulgarians come to feel there is little hope for their liberation, passive resistance and dissidence may decrease.

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RESISTANCE POTENTIAL UNDER WARTIME CONDITIONS

11. Upon outbreak of an East-West war, the resistance potential in Bulgaria would almost certainly increase. However, active resistance probably would be severely inhibited by the presence of Soviet forces, which could be expected to move into Bulgaria and establish bases for operations in the Near East and the Mediterranean area. Emergence of large-scale resistance could not be expected until the Communists had suffered major military defeats, transport and communications facilities were disrupted, and above all, until Western invasion were imminent.

12. In the event of such an invasion, especially if prior contacts had been established for guiding, coordinating and supplying Bulgarian resistance groups, outbreak of some guerrilla fighting would be likely. Escape and evasion operations for Western personnel could begin to function. The Rhodope and Balkan mountains provide ideal terrain for guerrilla bases. However, participation in such activities probably would not assume the character of a mass movement. Although Bulgarian history has been characterized by individual acts of violence, 500 years of Turkish rule did not produce great rebellions. A Bulgarian popular uprising against the Communist regime almost certainly would not materialize unless the Soviet rule had broken down, Western victory appeared assured, and clear-cut Western policy statements appealing to Bulgarians had been announced.

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ANNEX C: CZECHOSLOVAKIA

BASIC CAUSES OF DISSIDENCE

1. Even though the old Czechoslovak Republic had a more vigorous democratic tradition than any other Eastern European country and was strongly oriented toward the West, Communist strength was greater in Czechoslovakia than in the other present Satellites. In the last free elections in 1946, Communist candidates got 38 percent of the votes (43 percent in Bohemia-Moravia and 30 percent in Slovakia). Since the 1948 coup, however, the Communist regime's drastic reshaping of Czech political and economic life has alienated many one-time sympathizers and even many Party members. Communist police state methods, the discrimination against non-Party members, and the subordination of Czech interests to those of the USSR stand in sharp contrast to life under the first Republic. Czechoslovakia's new submission to foreign domination after its long struggle for independence is deeply resented on cultural as well as political grounds. In addition, disaffection is created by Soviet economic exploitation and internal mismanagement which have sharply lowered living standards. Food is scarce, agricultural production is lagging, and housing is inadequate. Consumer goods are often either unavailable or poorly made and expensive. The "new course" has to date done little to ameliorate this situation.

MAJOR DISSIDENT ELEMENTS

2. *Industrial workers,* many of whom voted Communist in 1946 and helped the regime in the 1948 coup, are now one of the most disaffected groups in Czechoslovakia. They complain about too long work hours, unpaid overtime, "voluntary" Sunday shifts, and too many deductions from the paycheck. They dislike the severe labor discipline and the favoritism toward Party members.

3. *Youth* is restless, disillusioned, and regimented by government youth organizations. Children of non-Party members are discriminated against in education and restricted in the choice of career. Most dissatisfied are those who were denied advanced schooling on political grounds and sent into unpopular industries such as mining. The greatest proportion of Czechs escaping into Germany and Austria consists of persons under 24 years of age.

4. The *peasantry,* well aware of the regime's designs for eventual collectivization, are not deceived by the temporary reduction of pressures under the "new course." Hostile toward the government and Party, they complain about high delivery quotas and low prices, lack of consumer goods, harassment by local Party officials, and unfair government distribution of farm machinery and fertilizer.

5. *Minorities.* Communist attempts to eliminate the thorny minority problem in Czechoslovakia have so far failed. The Slovaks in particular appear dissatisfied with Prague's growing domination of local administration. They tend to place the blame for this, and the 1948 coup, on the greater popular support given the Communist Party in Bohemia-Moravia during the 1946–1948 period. They also recall past Czech incursions into Slovak affairs. The Communist Party continues to have less influence in Slovakia than in Bohemia-Moravia and the Slovak potential for active resistance is probably higher. Whereas the German wartime occupation provoked mainly passive resistance in Bohemia-Moravia and only a few isolated acts of defiance occurred, the Slovak active resistance tradition was demonstrated in the uprising at Banska Bystrica in 1944.

6. The *clergy,* chiefly Roman Catholic, has been decimated by the regime. Many higher members of the hierarchy have been arrested and replaced by priests willing to collaborate with the Communists. The lower clergy is under close surveillance and obliged to submit sermons for censorship. The Church has been denied the right to educate. Known be-

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lievers are harassed and are deprived of chances for improvement of their position. The regime has more recently taken steps designed to give the impression that it is not undermining the Church, though in fact such steps are bringing it more under state control. These measures have greatly lessened the clergy's resistance potential.

7. The *middle class*, especially the professional and managerial groups, either has been dispossessed outright and placed under surveillance, or works under supervision of Party members whose professional background is almost invariably inferior. In spite of recent attempts of the regime to enlist their cooperation, the vast majority of these groups are thoroughly disaffected; they have lost their social and financial status, are limited in their choice of jobs and use of talents, and live in constant fear of being blamed for any failure of the regime.

8. *Military.* Since many officers have a stake in the continuation of the regime, and there were thorough purges of pro-Western officers in 1948, the over-all reliability of the officer corps has probably increased. However, there is evidence that its loyalty to the regime leaves much to be desired. Unreliability is even more pronounced among the rank-and-file who reportedly resent the harsh discipline, close Soviet supervision, lack of leave, and constant indoctrination. As a conscript force, the army reflects the low morale of the general population. The air force is probably one of the least reliable in the Satellites. There have been several defections from the military services to the West in the past few years.

INTENSITY OF RESISTANCE

9. Although dissidence seems to be somewhat more pronounced in Slovakia than in Bohemia-Moravia, there is little evidence of active resistance in either area. Communist police controls are so pervasive that people are afraid to voice their criticism of the regime, let alone engage in open resistance. Moreover, there is a conviction that Soviet troops, while not at present stationed in Czechoslovakia, would come to the help of the regime to put down any revolt that could not be handled locally, and there is no hope that any uprising would receive Western help. The only open demonstration of Czech disaffection occurred in the abortive Pilsen riots of June 1953, following the currency reform. Otherwise, the Czechoslovaks have been sullen and apathetic, passively expressing their dissatisfaction with the regime through a high percentage of absenteeism (sometimes up to 20 percent of the entire labor force), shoddy workmanship, high labor turnover, opposition to farm collectivization and crop delivery quotas, higher attendance at Church services, refusal to accept Eastern cultural orientation, etc.

EMIGRE GROUPS

10. There are numerous and voluble emigre groups with headquarters in the US, Canada, and Europe, but there is virtually no evidence that any of them play an active role in Czechoslovakia resistance. The most important is the Council of Free Czechoslovakia, consisting of Czechs and Slovaks and perhaps representing the nearest approximation to the Masaryk-Benes tradition. The Czech National Council and the Slovak National Council Abroad are separatist organizations of minor importance. The extreme-rightist Slovak Liberation Committee, led by Ferdinand Durcansky, who maintains contact with extreme-rightist Germans, probably has little influence in Slovakia. Representatives of the old political parties, and of a Czech labor group and a Sudeten-German group, also live abroad, but they have little personal following among the emigres in the West and probably less in Czechoslovakia itself, although the number of party followers is probably still large.

11. It is possible that some contacts between these organizations and their home country were maintained between 1948 and 1951, but there have almost certainly been no contacts of significance since. According to defector reports, internal Czechoslovak interest in emigre groups is feeble and does not indicate a desire to entrust future leadership to any of the emigre leaders. Therefore, it is unlikely that emigres are in a position to direct

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resistance activities nor is there evidence that any one of the factions would be acceptable for government leadership in a liberated Czechoslovakia.

RESISTANCE POTENTIAL UNDER COLD WAR CONDITIONS

12. There is considerable resistance potential in Czechoslovakia, particularly among industrial workers, and there might be an occasional recurrence of isolated riots like that of June 1953. However, active cold war resistance is highly unlikely to emerge on any significant scale so long as there are stringent police and party controls. On the other hand, passive resistance will probably continue in the form of absenteeism, isolated acts of subtle industrial and agricultural sabotage, disseminating the contents of Western broadcasts, and escapes and defections to the West.

RESISTANCE POTENTIAL UNDER WARTIME CONDITIONS

13. The intensification of regime security measures upon the outbreak of general war in Europe, and the active participation of Soviet forces, would make immediate organization of large-scale resistance all but impossible. Even unorganized passive resistance would probably become more dangerous. However, if the West appeared to be winning, an increase in passive resistance and unorganized attempts at sabotage could be expected. Resistance in the Czech lands would probably be mostly passive, but in Slovakia more active resistance might develop. For example, small anti-Communist guerrilla bands might be able to operate successfully in the more remote and inaccessible areas of Slovakia. The success of such efforts would greatly depend upon the ability of the West to establish contacts and furnish arms.

14. If Western forces approached the Czech borders and the effectiveness of the security organization weakened, restlessness and insubordination would probably increase sharply. More intelligence for the West would be forthcoming, more escape and evasion operations on behalf of Western personnel would be undertaken, and intensified anti-Communist propaganda could be expected. An impending Western invasion of Czechoslovakia would probably demoralize indigenous security forces to such an extent that Soviet troops would largely have to take over. At such a time, parts of the Czechoslovak Army and police would probably defect in growing numbers. Some of them probably would try to establish an anti-Communist record by participating in organized resistance. At this point, the anti-Communist intelligentsia, freed political prisoners and displaced persons might contribute substantially to organizing resistance.

15. However, full-scale guerrilla war in Slovakia and open organized resistance in Bohemia-Moravia still could not be expected before a virtual breakdown of Communist controls. Moreover, there might be, at least for some time, conflict between anti-Communist and pro-Communist guerrillas, diminishing the effect of resistance and confusing escape and evasion operations. Some antiregime resistance elements might also insist on taking ferocious revenge for their sufferings at the expense of assisting the West in combating Communist troops.

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ANNEX D: EAST GERMANY

BASIC CAUSES OF DISSIDENCE

1. The widespread popular disaffection in East Germany is intensified by the fact that unlike the other Satellites, the "German Democratic Republic" (GDR)[1] is not cut off from contact with the West. The special conditions of the occupation have made impossible the complete separation of the GDR from West Germany, and both the GDR and the Federal Republic have encouraged contacts between the two areas. Such contacts exist on an extensive scale. Moreover, the East Germans are tied to West Germany by common bonds of national identity and by the hope that eventual unification will mean liberation.

2. Most East Germans do not feel that they are living in a separate country and do not look upon the GDR as permanent. Rather, they see it as a temporary administrative device, imposed upon them by Communist puppets backed by Soviet guns. The abortive uprisings of 17 June 1953 proved to the East Germans as well as to the Soviets that without the backing of the Soviet Army, the GDR regime could not remain in power. Moreover, the Soviet occupation in East Germany cannot be disguised. Consequently, Communism is now identified with Soviet rule and discredited accordingly. The leaders of the Communist SED (Socialist Unity Party) and the government are generally hated and detested. Police state measures to keep the people in line exacerbate these sentiments.

3. Economic hardships are another major cause of antiregime sentiment. Except for the Party hierarchy, government, and the intelligentsia, nearly every East German has been adversely affected by the practices of the regime. While the introduction of the "new course" in mid-1953 and some Soviet reparations concessions had somewhat improved living conditions, these improvements have been insufficient to reduce popular disaffection. Although the GDR's antireligious campaign has not been as violent as those of other Satellites, it also contributes to popular dissatisfaction. Finally, the regime's attempts to orient East German culture eastward are much resented. The East Germans consider themselves culturally as belonging to the West, and believe their culture to be superior to that of the East. Communist attempts to change this outlook have contributed to resentment against the regime.

4. Disaffection in East Germany is very great, not only among the disaffected groups listed below but also among many rank-and-file members of the Party and its mass organizations, the government bureaucracy, white collar workers, and the "technical intelligentsia." During 1953, 340,000 East Germans fled to West Germany; during 1954, the number of refugees decreased to 200,000. It has been estimated that not more than 10 percent of the population actually support the regime, and it is almost certain that such support is confined to people who have a personal stake in the regime's continuation. Very few are motivated by ideological conviction.

MAJOR DISSIDENT ELEMENTS

5. *Industrial Workers.* In contrast to the other Satellites, where the peasantry is the chief dissident element, disaffection and resistance in the GDR are greatest in the industrial centers. About one-third of the estimated 6.5 million wage and salary earners in the GDR are industrial workers. Seventy percent of these are employed in the nationalized industries. There is evidence that many workers, probably a majority, are dissatisfied with the regime. Most East German workers have been traditionally social-democratic and strongly trade union minded. German social-democracy has always been evolutionary rather than revolutionary and, therefore, was the target of intensive Bolshevik hostility. Since the tradition of free trade unionism is

[1] For the purposes of this estimate, the GDR is assumed to include East Berlin.

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so strong, the fact that under the GDR the unions have become instruments of government control has greatly contributed to the disaffection of the workers. Furthermore, the workers are disgruntled with low wages, substandard living conditions, insufficient food supplies, lack of consumer goods, ever-present offensive propaganda, forced attendance at political rallies, imposition of Soviet labor methods, and a constant drive for more production without adequate rewards.

6. *The Peasantry.* There are still some 600,000 independent peasants in East Germany who cultivate about two-thirds of the arable land. Even though many of them benefited from the postwar land reform, the overwhelming majority are opposed to the regime, largely as a result of the collectivization program begun in mid-1952. Special privileges were extended to members of the so-called "cooperatives," to the detriment of independent farmers. Since mid-1952, about one-seventh of the arable land has been abandoned by its owners. The "new course" improved conditions somewhat and the regime, in view of poor agricultural production, slowed down its collectivization program. However, peasant disaffection is still strong. Moreover, there are indications that the collectivization program is being resumed.

7. *Businessmen.* Private industry still accounts for 15 percent of total industrial production; private wholesale and retail trade account for about 6 and 31 percent respectively of trade turnover. Although this group received some relief as a result of the "new course," they probably realize that this is only a temporary reprieve and that their group will eventually be liquidated. The outlook of this group is of necessity antiregime, but many of its elements continue to be conservative and cautious, inclined only to passive resistance, if any, and that only provided they see no risk.

8. *The Clergy.* The Protestant and Catholic clergy has been outspoken in assailing Communist atheism and combat particularly the regime's effort to indoctrinate youth. Concessions made by the regime to the Protestants in mid-1953 did not alter their attitude. The adverse effect of the regime's antireligious campaign on a large part of the population and the support received by the churches in East Germany from the West Germans have forced the regime to apply a milder type of persecution than practiced by other Satellite governments. The resistance potential of the clergy is considerable, though it is not at the point of open active resistance at this time.

9. *Military.* Many officers of the 100,000 men KVP (Garrisoned People's Police) and the small naval and air contingents probably resent Soviet controls. They enjoy preferential treatment but as a group, their basic loyalty to the regime is questionable. It is uncertain whether the GDR regime could rely on them in time of war, especially if the Communists suffered reverses, but there is probably less resentment in this group than in any other in the GDR, and their resistance potential is likely to be limited. The morale of enlisted men is low. The general popular disaffection is shared by most soldiers, many of whom have been pressured into service against their will. In spite of some improvement of their living conditions during 1954, most of them are probably not loyal to the regime and would side with the West if given opportunity.

10. *Youth Groups.* The regime has made strenuous efforts to control and indoctrinate youth. There are indications of support for the regime by some young people, but many have become indifferent or disillusioned. The influence of parents, older workers, and non-Communist teachers, and the nearness of the West still militate against success of the Communist youth program. In most cases, the attitude of East German youth is one of opportunism. Although the majority of East German youth almost certainly is not yet loyal to the Communist regime, it has made little or no efforts to resist the regime. A relatively small group of more mature young people may eventually constitute a resistance potential but just as many will probably become Communist enthusiasts unless their chances for better living improve greatly.

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INTENSITY OF RESISTANCE

11. Despite the great extent of disaffection in the GDR, with the single exception of the 17 June 1953 uprisings it expressed itself only in defection, transmission of intelligence, passive resistance (without risk involved), antiregime propaganda activities, and apathy. Although unrest was growing before June 1953, the intervention of the Soviet Army in the June uprisings, the lack of expected help from the West, and lack of progress toward reunification weakened East German hopes for an early liberation and led to a more passive attitude. The failure of the 17 June uprisings resulted in the arrest or flight to the West of many actual or potential resistance leaders and made it clear to those who remained that a successful uprising against the regime is impossible so long as the Soviet Army controls East Germany. Some improvement in living conditions and such political concessions as more freedom of travel between East and West Germany, as well as East German reluctance to take risks against overwhelming odds, have contrived to keep resistance predominantly passive.

12. However, the feasibility of access to the GDR from West Berlin and West Germany has facilitated the organization of some resistance groups operating from these areas. These groups encourage cautious covert resistance activities; their main objects are antiregime propaganda, keeping files of persons in Communist prisons and assisting families of the prisoners, keeping track of crimes committed by the Communists, keeping alive the spirit of resistance, and gathering as much information as possible. They discourage, however, overt active resistance which stands little chance of escaping harsh retaliation.

RESISTANCE POTENTIAL UNDER COLD WAR CONDITIONS

13. While rearmament of West Germany would almost certainly raise East German hopes for eventual liberation from Communist rule, strengthened GDR police controls, and Soviet help if necessary, will probably forestall any attempt at open resistance. So long as the USSR maintains sizeable forces in East Germany, resistance will almost certainly remain limited to intelligence collection, antiregime propaganda dissemination, and defection. The East Germans realize that the steadily improving infiltration methods of the regime's security organs render attempts at organization in GDR territory extremely dangerous. They probably also realize (after June 1953) that under present conditions tangible Western help for large-scale resistance will not be forthcoming during the cold war period.

RESISTANCE POTENTIAL UNDER WARTIME CONDITIONS

14. The outbreak of a general war probably would not lead to organized resistance at once, although (depending upon the location of battle fronts and the fortunes of war) there would probably be an increase in isolated acts of sabotage and violence. But so long as Soviet power remained unimpaired, savage retaliation for any act of resistance, coupled with a limited number of areas offering concealment, would make organized resistance virtually impossible. Active resistance on an extensive scale would almost certainly not be initiated until Communist controls appeared to be weakening or breaking down as a result of Soviet defeats and the proximity of Western forces.

15. If East Germany became a combat area, many of those East German forces which could do so would probably seek to join the West in fighting the Bloc. Furthermore, if military operations were in progress within the GDR, organized resistance groups almost certainly would supply information, disrupt Soviet communications, sabotage war material, and assist Western soldiers in escape and evasion on a scale measured by Western successes. On the other hand, Western defeats would immediately lead to a reduction in East German resistance activities.

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ANNEX E: HUNGARY

BASIC CAUSES OF DISSIDENCE

1. Dissidence, which is very widespread in Hungary, has its roots in economic discontent, deeply entrenched nationalism, traditional western orientations, historical and psychological antagonism toward Slavs, and strong Roman Catholic religious heritage (two-thirds of the Hungarians are Catholic). Dissidence is aggravated by recollection of the 1919 Bela Kun Communist regime which included Rakosi, Gerö, and other current leaders, by dislike of Communism on the part of all age groups, and by antagonism toward neighboring Satellites which have acquired former Hungarian territories. The inadequate standard of living is probably the most important cause of dissidence. Work norms are high, wages are low, housing is poor, and food is scarce. The people resent regimentation, compulsory political activities, and the lack of leisure time. They also resent the oppressive police state system which is maintained by the state security apparatus, by the civil police, and by the presence of two Soviet divisions. Apathy and cynicism are widespread.

MAJOR DISSIDENT ELEMENTS

2. *The peasantry,* with the exception of a relatively small number of collective farm members who were formerly landless, represents the largest single focus of opposition to the Communist regime. The concessions introduced by the so-called "new course" in 1953 have done little to alleviate peasant complaints. In spite of the financial and social hardships connected with such action, about one-half of the approximately 515,000 peasants in collectives took advantage of the regime's offer to withdraw if they so desired. Moreover, the continuation of the "new course" is uncertain.

3. The majority of *industrial workers,* some of whom were among the few original supporters of Communism, now constitute a major dissident element. A low living standard, poor working conditions, the perversion of labor unions into instruments of the regime, the constant pressure for more production without adequate incentives, harsh labor discipline, and the regime's poor showing in labor protection and welfare have made the proletariat a potential resistance element rather than the "spearhead of revolution."

4. *Youth.* One of the most conspicuous failures of the regime has been its inability to secure the firm support of youth. By its own admission, the principal youth movement (DISZ) is plagued by a general apathy toward Party work, which retards the recruiting of future intellectual cadres for Communism. Open criticism of this organization has been rising steadily since 1952, and the "new course" has so far failed to meet this situation. The majority of students in high and technical schools and universities remain negative or indifferent toward Communism.

5. *Military.* Considerable resistance potential is believed to exist within the Hungarian armed forces. Their loyalty is generally questionable, except for higher officers who have the greatest stake in the regime. The Air Force is believed to be predominantly loyal. However, since the majority of young army officers are recruited from rural areas, they almost certainly share those antiregime attitudes which make the peasantry the greatest focus of dissidence. The rank-and-file of the army, who have none of the officers' privileges, have even less reason for allegiance. Soviet control of the Hungarian Army contributes to animosity and disaffection as does forcible alliance with neighboring Satellites who are ancient enemies. This resistance potential of the armed forces, however, cannot be realized unless a marked deterioration of the regime's control system takes place.

6. The *clergy,* both Catholic and Protestant, no longer show open defiance of the regime. They do, however, exercise considerable influence among the people and, despite their lack

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of aggressive leadership, maintain some covert and sporadic opposition. The clergy are cautious and adroit in the use of the "between-the-lines" technique in sermons and statements. The government-sponsored National Peace Committee of Catholic Priests has repeatedly admitted failure in propagandizing Communism. But while the clergy's resistance potential, especially in the provinces, remains strong at present, it is bound to decrease as more and more clergy are replaced by Communist supporters.

INTENSITY OF RESISTANCE

7. Hungary's recent history, including World War II, abounds with resistance incidents, but no broad resistance movement emerged and no local groups achieved lasting success. During the German occupation, sporadic acts of sabotage were committed against the Axis powers. The much more effective Soviet control system has restricted Hungarian resistance to passive, unorganized manifestations. Other factors, such as physically and psychologically exhausting work norms, material want, and compulsory political activities have further discouraged active resistance.

8. However, passive resistance in Hungary appears to have been more widespread and effective than elsewhere in the Satellites. Although existing controls preclude open uprisings, intensified passive resistance by industrial and agricultural workers is impeding the regime's efforts to build a strong and viable economy.

EMIGRE GROUPS

9. There are three main Hungarian emigre organizations: the Hungarian National Council in New York, General Andras Zako's League of Hungarian Veterans with headquarters in Innsbruck, and the Hungarian Liberation Movement, led by General Ferenc Kisbarnaki-Farkas, with headquarters in Munich. The leadership of the latter two groups was merged in 1954. Although it is possible that these emigre groups have been in touch with elements of unknown reliability inside Hungary, it is unlikely that they have, as sometimes claimed, organized any significant resistance movements. Information which they have gathered has proved of dubious value. Moreover, the political disunity and the controversial background of many of their leaders has almost certainly discredited these emigre groups in the eyes of resisters inside Hungary. Besides the above mentioned emigre groups, there also exists a numerically small but well-organized group of extreme rightists under General Arpad Henney, consisting of fanatical Nazi-type activists, most of whom were members or supporters of the so-called Arrow Cross Party during World War II. This group will not cooperate with Western powers unless its conditions are met; its political ideology, somewhat camouflaged, runs so counter to Western concepts as to make its successful integration into a general resistance movement unlikely. There is some evidence that Yugoslavia has had limited success with clandestine operations to propagate Titoism in Hungary.

RESISTANCE POTENTIAL UNDER COLD WAR CONDITIONS

10. Effective internal security control and lack of know-how will continue to limit the development of organized resistance, active or passive. Cold war activities, at best, will probably remain restricted to information collection, clandestine antiregime propaganda, isolated acts of sabotage, and unorganized passive resistance. Poor terrain impedes the formation of nuclei for future guerrilla operations; the development of contacts for escape and evasion would be difficult, even on a local level. Further factors militating against an active resistance build-up are: the vigilance of the police, the presence of Soviet troops, lack of experienced resistance leaders, lack of contact with Western agencies that could guide and help them, and the absence of a well-developed security consciousness. However, Hungarian capabilities for unorganized passive resistance, especially in industry and agriculture, will remain substantial.

RESISTANCE POTENTIAL UNDER WARTIME CONDITIONS

11. Under conditions of open warfare, Communist security measures would almost cer-

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tainly be so greatly increased that no significant resistance could be expected until Western forces had won major victories in Europe. In the event of such victories, passive resistance probably would increase sharply, and clandestine organization of large-scale resistance would be attempted, possibly with the help of disaffected military or police elements. There would probably also be increased popular willingness to assist in escape and evasion, and defections would become more numerous. However, premature guerrilla warfare and sabotage would be likely to provoke reprisals of a nature which would retard, if not cripple, the development of effective resistance. If Western military success brought about a deterioration of the Hungarian state and security apparatus, resistance activities would almost certainly sharply increase. Their scope and effectiveness would depend upon the extent of Western aid, the ability to establish communications, and the degree of weakness in the state security controls. Assistance to Western forces probably would take the form of organized support of escape and evasion operations, information collection, psychological warfare, sabotage and, possibly, limited guerrilla warfare. The most likely sources of defection under such circumstances would be: (a) army enlisted personnel; (b) the mass of political prisoners; (c) the unreconciled intelligentsia; (d) peasants and industrial workers in areas near the Western forces; and (e) youth.

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ANNEX F: RUMANIA

BASIC CAUSES OF DISSIDENCE

1. After the USSR occupied Rumania at the end of World War II, it quickly proceeded to re-annex Northern Bukovina and Bessarabia, liquidate the non-Communist government, drive the King out of the country, and delegate power to a puppet regime under absolute Soviet control. As a result the vast majority of Rumanians, deprived of their Western contacts and of self-determination, have come to feel that their country is virtually a Soviet colony. They have almost certainly identified Communism with their traditional fear of Russia. Moreover, Soviet economic exploitation since 1944 has been so great that even a country as rich in natural resources as Rumania had been chronically in want. War booty, reparations, and the operation of Soviet-Rumanian mixed companies placed a staggering load on its economy. The sharply depressed living standards which resulted are blamed on Soviet exploitation. Adding to Rumanian fear and resentment on these scores, the brutal methods of a Communist police state have imposed an alien way of life.

MAJOR DISSIDENT ELEMENTS

2. *Peasantry.* The violent opposition of the peasantry, comprising about 70 percent of the population, has constrained the regime to proceed very slowly in collectivizing agriculture. Not only kulaks and small farmers but also landless peasants have resisted the process. It is questionable whether even the poor, landless peasants who constitute 42 percent of the present membership of collective farms, can easily be induced to adopt the collective principle itself. By the regime's own admission agricultural production is lower than before the war. The kulaks and small farmers are producing almost all the grain the country grows, and the regime has been unwilling to take drastic steps in the face of their apparent solidarity. Thus the peasantry constitutes a formidable resistance potential.

3. *Industrial workers* are worse off than the peasants, who at least are able to dodge forced deliveries and to acquire on the black market what is needed for their personal consumption. The urban and industrial population suffers from a depressed living standard, poor housing, food shortages, and other privations. Workers cannot obtain necessary consumer goods; they are forbidden to leave their jobs and are subject to constant political indoctrination and police surveillance. Those who supported the regime at the beginning of the Communist rule are becoming disillusioned, and a considerable passive resistance potential is accumulating.

4. *Youth.* Large sections of Rumanian youth are opposed to the regime. Tradition, which is strong in Rumania, together with the individualistic tendencies of youth, militate against acceptance of regimented life and Communist group control techniques. The regime has been far less successful in gaining the loyalty of youth than it had expected.

5. *Military.* With the exception of those higher officers who are good Communists (or who have survived the purges) and who have a stake in the regime's continuation, the reliability of the armed forces is questionable. Opportunism has been a predilection in Rumania, ingrained during centuries of foreign rule, and most of the officers are probably opportunists. Enlisted men, coming mainly from rural areas imbued with the antiregime feeling, are almost certainly only bowing to force. If the regime were to lose its grip on the control apparatus and if Soviet supervision were withdrawn, very few of the enlisted men would prove reliable.

6. *Intellectuals, clergymen, national minorities.* In addition to the above, there are various lesser groups which might have considerable resistance potential. The intellectual and professional elements in particular have generally resisted Communist indoctrination. There is evidence that not enough Commu-

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nist-trained teachers are available. Many members of the professions and almost all of the former higher and middle classes, now deprived of their property and displaced socially, are intensely hostile to the regime. The top hierarchy of the Orthodox Church has been largely reoriented toward the Moscow Patriarchate and some of the leading anti-Soviet churchmen have been eliminated, but the rank-and-file of the lower clergy and the parish priests remain at heart anti-Communist. They constitute a considerable resistance potential, as do the clergymen of the Catholic and Uniate Church whose institutions have been virtually destroyed. National minorities, particularly the Hungarians, are constantly dissatisfied, and, indeed, would be opposed to any Rumanian government which would not cater to their national aspirations.

INTENSITY OF DISSIDENCE

7. Although dissidence is strong in almost all segments of Rumanian society, including the lower echelons of the government and Party, active organized resistance has steadily declined in the past several years and appears to be virtually extinct at present. Isolated instances of active unorganized resistance are still being reported, and are sometimes admitted by the Communists. Moreover, the regime has not succeeded in eliminating passive resistance, which continues to express itself mainly in economic sabotage. However, such resistance is not exclusively anti-Communist in motivation, but reflects considerable degree of self-interest or frustration. Acts of economic sabotage such as absenteeism, deliberate damage to machinery, occasional derailing of trains, arson, work slowdowns, and general negligence may or may not be politically motivated. Whatever the motivation, there does appear to be considerable resistance impeding agriculture, government-sponsored trade, industry, and the over-all implementation of the Communist program. This fact is openly admitted by the regime.

EMIGRE GROUPS

8. King Mihai, who could become a rallying point of the Rumanian emigration, appears to accept factions of three exile parties as legal representatives of the Rumanian people. Factional strife, however has greatly undermined their importance. The King is probably the only person who maintains a semblance of continuity of a non-Communist Rumanian government-in-exile. There is also a group of left Socialists, and some Iron Guardists, who are opposed to a restoration of the monarchy. Evidence exists that the King is still popular in Rumania, particularly among the peasantry, but the problem of non-Communist succession to the Communist regime will probably remain a source of factional strife.

9. Few, if any, contacts seem to exist between the emigres and the homeland. Communications are very precarious and censorship is rigid. All borders are closely guarded and patrolled. Rumanian language broadcasts from the West are jammed; they appear to be heard best in rural areas. Printed anti-regime propaganda which has frequently reached Rumanians is reported to have encouraged sporadic manifestations of resistance.

RESISTANCE POTENTIAL UNDER COLD WAR CONDITIONS

10. Under cold war conditions, such active resistance as may still exist can be expected to decline as the regime's security controls improve and as long as there is no clear indication of positive aid from the West. Nevertheless, there may be sporadic, disjointed guerrilla-type raids of no more than local significance, particularly from the less accessible parts of Rumania. Passive resistance will probably also continue in a variety of forms, chiefly economic sabotage. At best, such activities will retard the implementation of the regime's political and economic program; at the least, they will have a nuisance value, keeping numbers of reliable Communists from performing more useful work.

RESISTANCE POTENTIAL UNDER WARTIME CONDITIONS

11. In the event of open war, Rumanian security forces would almost certainly be re-

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inforced by Soviet troops. The resulting intensification of security measures would probably minimize even passive resistance. Nevertheless some guerrilla activity might develop. The extent of active organized resistance would depend on the military situation in Europe, notably the nearness of Western forces, the help made available by the West, and the attitude of the Balkan Pact countries, notably Yugoslavia. There might be some attempts at defection to Yugoslavia, if that country sided with the West. As Western troops approached Rumanian territory, guerrilla warfare against local Communists and Soviet units might flare up even before Western forces actually entered the country.

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ANNEX G: USSR

BASIC CAUSES OF DISSIDENCE

1. Russia has a long history of resistance, but the revolution of 1917 was the only successful act of resistance in modern times resulting in the overthrow of a government in power. It occurred only after the war had virtually destroyed central authority. The new Bolshevik leaders were careful to establish security controls strong enough to prevent another popular revolt. Nevertheless, passive resistance continued. It showed great strength during the 1930's when Stalin was forcing through collectivization of agriculture. At the beginning of World War II mass desertions occurred and various national minorities were willing to collaborate with the Germans until harsh Nazi policies rebuffed them. The colossal devastation of World War II resulted in widespread discontent which necessitated powerful application of coercive measures. The most troublesome postwar areas proved to be those which the USSR had newly annexed: the Baltic States, the western parts of the Ukraine and Belorussia, and Moldavia. Partisan movements flourished in all these areas, especially in the Baltic States and the western Ukraine, until mass deportations and police terror succeeded in subduing them. The continued strain imposed upon the Soviet people by Stalin's foreign and economic policies compelled the Politburo to retain most of the wartime controls and even to strengthen some of them. However, by 1949, order had been restored throughout the country, and operations against the partisans in the troubled areas had eliminated nearly all organized resistance.

2. Many Soviet citizens, largely convinced by Soviet propaganda of the improvements since Czarist days, probably feel that their lot has improved. Moreover, a core of adherents of Communist ideology are willing to accept privations in its name. However, there appears to be some degree of discontent and disaffection at nearly every level of Soviet society. This dissidence is not based so much upon opposition to Communist ideology *per se* as upon neglect or denial by the Communist leadership of basic popular rights and needs. Poor living conditions probably constitute the most significant cause. The apparent unwillingness or inability of the Soviet Government to raise the standard of living is exacerbated by the knowledge, acquired by millions of Soviet soldiers during World War II, that things are better abroad. All-pervading fear of the police also contributes greatly to dissidence as do the social stratification, nepotism, and favoritism, which divide the ruling elements from the masses. Finally, antireligious campaigns and the Russification of the national minorities have created extensive resentment.

DISTRIBUTION OF DISSIDENCE

3. *Peasantry.* Of all social groups, the peasants have suffered most under Soviet rule. Their living standard is the lowest, except for that of the forced laborer. Soviet ruthlessness in collectivization and pressure for increased production have provoked strong hostility. The attempts by peasants to recover their status as individual land owners during the German occupation demonstrated their opposition to the collective system. Continued insufficiency of agricultural production since the war is probably due in part to lack of peasant cooperation. The government has made a number of minor concessions to the peasants but not enough to stimulate their cooperation or to overcome their opposition to collectivism.

4. *Youth.* A considerable segment of Soviet youth probably support the Soviet regime. Generally, they receive special consideration from the government. Their education and indoctrination are carefully supervised. Nevertheless, there are elements among the youth whose loyalty is open to question. Among them are: (a) children of parents persecuted by the regime; (b) descendants of Czarist officialdom; (c) offspring of kulaks, of purge victims and of inmates of forced labor camps;

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(d) the young men who have served in the armed forces abroad and were able to compare their living standard with the much higher one outside the USSR; and (e) some students of higher educational institutions. There have been persistent reports of anti-Communist organizations among university students; such a group was uncovered at the university of Moscow and allegedly at Kaunas. Constant admonitions in the Komsomol papers have denounced youth's flouting of Soviet taboos.

5. *National Minorities.* About 45 percent of the Soviet population consists of national minorities, some with a distinguished history of their own. Russification of these minorities under the Tsars had little success. Initially the Bolsheviks propagandized the constitutional and cultural autonomy of their component republics and autonomous regions. After the war, possibly as a result of the poor showing of loyalty to the Soviet state during the German occupation by certain minorities, they sharply restricted cultural autonomy. Some minorities were liquidated as such by dispersal of populations, and whatever autonomy other minorities still enjoyed was virtually ended by intensified Russification and Sovietization. Consequently, disaffection was rampant. During the first postwar years, 200,000 partisans in the Ukraine and 100,000 in Lithuania reportedly battled Soviet troops. By 1949, the back of the revolt was broken. But even now the Ukrainian Party Secretariat finds it necessary to call publicly for vigilance against infiltration by Ukrainian partisans.

6. *Repressed Elements.* The millions of Soviet citizens who have been sentenced to forced labor camps and exile in remote Siberian areas constitute a fairly important resistance potential. During World War II, many such individuals emerged as leaders of collaboration in German-occupied territories. Their hatred of the Soviet regime almost certainly transcends their patriotic feelings. Knowing this, the government keeps former inmates of labor camps under strict controls. There have been persistent rumors of uprisings by forced laborers, supposed to have occurred between 1948 and 1951. In the summer of 1953, strikes occurred at the Vorkuta and Norilsk camps in the Far North of Siberia. While the uprisings, from all accounts, were nonpolitical, they speak for the desperation of these repressed elements.

7. *Intellectuals.* In spite of the preferred position of intellectuals in Soviet society, ideological controls and restriction of their freedom to create have probably led to accumulated resentment. As a result, quite a few intellectuals have withdrawn into themselves, refused to study Marxism, and turned to insignificant fields where Party control is less pronounced. Except for a few Communist fanatics, those artists and scientists who find themselves frustrated by Party ukases telling them what is correct, appear to be conforming outwardly while inwardly resisting. However, before a breakdown in Soviet controls they will almost certainly maintain sufficient conformity to avoid losing their material advantages.

8. *Industrial Workers.* There is frequent evidence of discontent among the mass of factory workers. The very low living standard, constant pressure for production under unfavorable conditions, lack of freedom of movement, and harsh labor discipline have almost certainly caused widespread discontent. While there has been a slight increase in food and consumer goods in recent years, it is not nearly enough to satisfy the workers. Moreover, the promises of increased consumer goods since Stalin's death, have recently been de-emphasized.

9. *Armed Forces.* In general the armed forces constitute a bulwark of the regime rather than a threat to it. Over-all morale is considered to be sufficiently high to insure the reliability of the armed forces, although there are many reports of low morale in individual instances. The officers, especially in the higher ranks, are a favored economic group. However, the Kronstadt mutiny (1921), the purges in the late 1930's, the low morale of the Red Army at the beginning of World War II, mass desertions and the establishment of a resistance army under Vlasov in German-occupied territory, and the persistant postwar defections in Germany and Austria have caused the

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Soviet Government to take extraordinary precautions, including police and Party surveillance, and virtual isolation of troops from native populations in occupied territories. A few defections to the West are still occurring. Harsh discipline, a wide cleavage between officers and men, inescapable indoctrination and surveillance by an all-prevading informer system create discontent in the service and tend to decrease the value of its material advantages of clothing, shelter, and food. Morale in the Soviet Navy and Air Forces appears to be higher than that in the Army.

INTENSITY OF RESISTANCE

10. Although some dissidence exists at nearly every level of Soviet society, the regime has succeeded in establishing such pervasive authority that the people are forced to devote their energies to coping with the system rather than to conceiving an alternative solution or taking steps to achieve such a solution. Extensive resistance, such as occurred in the newly acquired territories after the end of World War II, had virtually ceased to exist by 1950. The strikes and riots reported in Far Northern labor camps may not have reflected political motivation and in any case were quickly suppressed. Whether indications of passive resistance in agriculture, industry, and the lower bureaucracy are not merely a demonstration of time-honored Russian indifference or apathy cannot be estimated with any confidence. In sum, the gulf between dissidence and resistance in the USSR is far wider than elsewhere in the Bloc (except possibly in Communist China).

EMIGRE GROUPS

11. Numerous emigre organizations claim to represent Russians and national minorities. Of these, the Solidarists (NTS) — Great Russians — are the largest and most important. Some former Vlasov adherents and numbers of recent defectors have joined this movement. Whenever emigre groups are known by Soviet defectors or by listeners to Russian-language broadcasts, it is the NTS which appears to have the pre-eminent place.

12. According to defector reports, there is little or no awareness among the Soviet people of the present activities of emigre groups. Defectors who admit familiarity with these groups acquired their knowledge in Germany and Austria. However, there are likely to be some memories from the war when many emigre groups, particularly the NTS, were active not only in German-occupied Soviet territory but also among the millions of Russians deported to Germany for forced labor. Moreover, the Soviet press itself keeps such memories alive by occasional attacks on the emigre movement. During the early postwar years, there were some contacts between emigre groups and partisan groups in western areas of the USSR. Some tenuous connections may still exist but are almost certainly negligible. The Soviet security apparatus has pacified the new Western territories and deported many of the inhabitants, partially replacing them with Great Russians. Some slight contacts may still exist between the West and members of the former Uniate Church in the Ukraine which was forcibly amalgamated with the Russian Orthodox Church in the late 1940's.

13. The minority emigre organizations are not now in a position to gain the sympathy of the Great Russians to any appreciable extent. The peoples of the recently incorporated areas, especially in the Baltic States and the Western Ukraine, may for a while be inclined to look to emigre organizations for support. But in those national minority areas which have long been under Soviet rule (the Ukraine, Georgia, Byelo-Russia, etc.), the people would almost certainly feel, like the Great Russians, that the emigres have been away from their homeland so long that they have lost their grasp of Soviet realities. The people would also resent what they believe to be the emigres' "luxurious living" in the West and are still disillusioned over the connection of some emigre organizations with the Nazi regime. They probably are unaware of any acceptable political alternative to Soviet Communism. On the other hand, the Soviet Government itself has given signs of apprehension lest emigre groups be used for infiltration purposes and has indicated fear of their organization

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and propaganda. This was demonstrated in the Khokhlov and other cases, where they did not shrink from elaborately preparing the murder of an emigre leader. Another aspect of the effort to neutralize emigre groups is the Soviet attempt to encourage emigres to return, promising them good treatment.

RESISTANCE POTENTIAL UNDER COLD WAR CONDITIONS

14. Under continued cold war conditions, active resistance against the Soviet system is highly unlikely unless the regime's security apparatus becomes seriously weakened. Some degree of passive resistance will probably continue, ranging from camouflaged disobedience of Party rules to agricultural and industrial sabotage. It may also be expressed in cynical attitudes toward the regime, attempts to listen to Western broadcasts, lack of interest in working for the objectives of the government, and defection.

RESISTANCE POTENTIAL UNDER WARTIME CONDITIONS

15. In the event of general war security would be tightened, virtually all people would be employed in the defense effort, and patriotic appeals would be launched. We are unable to estimate the extent of or the impact on resistance potential of such factors as: (a) Western military action; (b) the popular psychological reactions to such actions; or (c) the regime's ability to portray the war as a patriotic and defensive one.

16. In the event of major Soviet reverses, some mass defections from the army might occur, particularly among members of minority groups. If the war were prolonged and hostilities carried to Soviet soil, chances for resistance activities would probably improve, and an invading army might meet with cautious, but at least partially sympathetic, response as soon at it became evident that Nazi methods of occupation would not be repeated. In such a situation, anti-Communist partisans, particularly in the minority areas, could probably be induced to fight their Soviet masters. Nevertheless, even if hard pressed on the military fronts, the Soviet leaders would make a determined effort to maintain sufficient control in the hinterland to prevent resistance elements from becoming active behind their lines. Moreover, in event of an impending collapse of the Soviet Government, anti-Soviet elements of the population, together with labor camp inmates and forced exiles, could attain significant resistance capabilities. Aside from such groups, resistance among the broad masses of the Great Russian population would be difficult to organize. Patriotism, indoctrinated respect for Soviet authority, or apathy probably would render them passive and disinclined to active opposition. Unless the security apparatus were seriously weakened, little activity could be expected from the mass of the Great Russian population beyond local harassing operations, help to Western personnel in escape or evasion, dissemination of antiregime propaganda, limited intelligence activities, and defections.

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ANNEX H: NORTH VIETNAM

BASIC CAUSES OF DISSIDENCE

1. In the past, the main political factors which have created ill-will toward the Democratic Republic of Vietnam (DRV) have been: imposition of rigid ideological controls, restriction of personal freedoms, terroristic police controls, persecution of minority and religious groups, and the rising influence of the unpopular Chinese. More recently disaffection has arisen from the transition to peace of a society long geared to war; the absorption of new territories (and large cities) which are increasingly feeling the weight of Communist oppression; and from resentment against the DRV for having sanctioned, at least temporarily, the division of the country. Popular hostility has also been created by such economic factors as: (a) heavy tax burdens, which deprive peasants of their surplus and prevent merchants from accumulating capital; (b) land reform measures displacing large numbers of families and creating severe dislocations; (c) conscription of labor; (d) depreciation of the currency; and (e) occasional acute rice shortages in certain areas. Living standards in DRV territory have always been poor but they are now even worse, and there is little chance for a speedy improvement.

2. Recent DRV measures, including the Franco-DRV agreement on French installations in North Vietnam, and the Communist Chinese-DRV aid agreement may, if implemented, somewhat alleviate the economic stringency now reportedly prevailing in DRV territory. Moreover, discontent has been counterbalanced to some extent by the following factors: (a) the prestige accruing to the regime as the result of its long successful war against the French; (b) its posture as a strong cohesive and determined government; and (c) the popular appeal of the regime's vigorous nationalism. The regime's identification of Communism with nationalism is almost certainly not recognized by the mass of the people as a Communist tactic, and may continue for some time to counteract popular grievances.

MAJOR DISSIDENT ELEMENTS

3. The *Catholics,* numbering some one and one-half million (of whom, however, at least 500,000 will have left for the south before May 1955), are probably the largest potential resistance element in North Vietnam. If the DRV honors its promise of religious tolerance, they may resign themselves to passive cooperation with the regime. If, however, the regime should decide to take strong measures against Catholic leaders and organizations, the Catholics might be provoked into stronger opposition.

4. *Ethnic minorities,* numbering about one and one-half million, oppose domination by the Vietnamese Communists but their resistance is ineffective. The DRV is now establishing "autonomous administrative areas" for larger ethnic minorities under Communist control, such as the one million Thai tribesmen; the same policy may also be applied to the Nungs, Muongs, Meos, Mans, and Thos. The resistance potential of these tribes is low, since they have no cohesion, leadership, or unity of purpose.

5. The *peasants* will almost certainly remain dissatisfied unless the regime can alleviate their grievances. However, no more than passive resistance can be expected so long as the regime exercises pervasive political and police controls.

6. The *dispossessed elements,* among whom can be counted non-Communist Chinese, remnants of non-Communist political groups, merchants, and landlords, are, of course, highly disaffected and, given an opportunity, would participate in resistance activities. In view of the regime's very tight security controls, however, these elements will almost certainly be gradually liquidated.

INTENSITY OF RESISTANCE

7. Incomplete information, paucity of intelligence sources, and the fluidity of the present situation virtually preclude an accurate estimate of the character and intensity of re-

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sistance within DRV territory. Prior to the Geneva agreement there were indications of an anti-Viet Minh potential caused chiefly by Communist terrorism and persecution, and by fear of rising Chinese influence. Continued dissatisfaction with the regime is indicated by the flight of large numbers of civilian refugees from the DRV zone.[1] At the same time, the migration of these anti-Communist elements from North Vietnam has almost certainly weakened the resistance potential there as has the French withdrawal, and the increase of Viet Minh power and prestige since Geneva. Moreover, the regime's identification of Communism with nationalism, may continue at least for some time to distract attention from grievances. The anticolonial attitude on the part of the ethnic Vietnamese will continue to be used by the regime to popularize its actions. However, some degree of continued passive resistance may be expected from Vietnamese Catholics and from nonethnic minorities.

RESISTANCE POTENTIAL UNDER COLD WAR CONDITIONS

8. Such organized resistance groups as may still exist are poorly equipped and poorly trained. The current capabilities of such groups are probably limited to development of escape and evasion facilities, some training activities, and information collection. Unorganized resistance probably is limited to intermittent passive opposition. Expansion and intensification of resistance activities would be largely dependent upon logistic support and training of personnel in the use of equipment. Lack of coordination, caused chiefly by the mutual animosity of the various ethnic minorities, further reduces the already limited manpower available for guerrilla activities. The regime can be expected to use all methods at its disposal to reduce disaffection and liquidate vestiges of resistance. Even a weakening of security measures would probably not bring forth an appreciable resistance potential.

[1] About 700,000 people elected to leave the North between August 1954 and March 1955.

RESISTANCE POTENTIAL UNDER WARTIME CONDITIONS

9. Any estimate of the resistance potential in the DRV under conditions of open warfare is highly speculative. Resistance would depend on the ability to survive countermeasures, the extent to which security controls would be disrupted by military operations, and the amount of training and material aid that could be provided. Assuming that guerrillas were moderately successful in surviving and training with new equipment, at least some groups, such as the Thos and possibly the Nungs, and Mans, would be in a position to disrupt movements of overland supply columns along the routes from China into North Vietnam. However, the reluctance of most guerrilla groups to move any considerable distance from their tribal areas would limit their effectiveness. No cohesive and large-scale guerrilla activities can be expected, and existing groups would be unable to gain such control over large territorial areas in northern Tonkin as the Viet Minh did between 1943 and 1954. It is possible that some resistance elements could be utilized to spread rumors, distribute pamphlets, and collect information. However, willingness of resistance groups to act against the DRV regime would be contingent upon the military situation.

10. The nationality of attacking forces would probably influence the willingness of resistance groups to act. Tribal groups which have been helped by the French for many years, would be most receptive to French invaders. Vietnamese would prefer other Vietnamese first and the French last. Other nationalities probably acceptable would be Thais, Filipinos, and Americans. Participation of Nationalist Chinese might seriously jeopardize resistance and create antagonism toward the occupation. A military government administered by Vietnamese in ethnic Vietnamese areas would probably have a salutary effect upon resistance activities. A French occupation would be distrusted by the majority of the Vietnamese people, and would adversely affect anti-Communist partisan warfare.

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ANNEX I: NORTH KOREA

BASIC CAUSES OF DISSIDENCE

1. After decades of Japanese domination, which had aimed to wipe out Korea as a national entity and to make it a Japanese province, the Koreans were receptive to any type of government, provided it was Korean. Thus, it is not so much the form of government instituted in North Korea after World War II as the exploitative and oppressive methods and foreign flavor of the Communist regime which have created discontent. The extraordinary hardships which the North Koreans had to endure during the Korean War probably increased dissatisfaction and frustration. Moreover, the burdens imposed by postwar reconstruction (such as high taxes, forced labor, pressures to turn farmers into industrial laborers, contributions to political organizations, military conscription, and over-all shortages) have almost certainly intensified dissidence. The continued presence of large Chinese Communist forces in North Korea is probably also an important source of dissidence.

2. Although the North Koreans have very little access to information on developments in the ROK, the very existence of the Republic of Korea (ROK) as a visible alternative to the North Korean Communist regime and the desire for unification probably stimulate North Korean dissidence. In spite of the North Korean campaign of vilification against the ROK and the questionable popularity of the Rhee government, there is almost certainly a belief that conditions in South Korea are more satisfactory than in North Korea. Dissidence would probably grow if the advantages of living in the UN-backed ROK instead of Soviet-Chinese supported North Korea became more apparent.

MAJOR DISSIDENT ELEMENTS

3. Dissidence exists in varying degrees in every element of North Korean society, except the small Communist ruling group. It is particularly intense among the remnants of the Christian and former middle class elements. These constituted the main strength of the Korean Democratic Party which was established after liberation from Japan and subsequently liquidated in North Korea by the Communists. Considerable dissatisfaction also exists among the peasants, who feel that the regime is giving preferential treatment to industrial workers. There is disappointment and disillusionment even among the workers. Army morale probably is at least fair. Dissidence is probably most widespread in the enlisted ranks, which have been kept in service many years. Although there are indications of a discharge program, it probably does not provide for many early releases. Dissidence also extends to a small number of officers.

INTENSITY OF RESISTANCE

4. Even though the regime's methods and policies have caused considerable ill-will, there is no evidence that such disaffection is translated into resistance, probably because of the Korean tendency toward apathetic resignation and by identification of the regime with nationalist aspirations. Antiregime guerrilla activities, such as occurred earlier in the Korean War had declined greatly by 1951. Since then, heavy punishment for UN collaborators, nationalist propaganda, severe political control, and stimulation of "anticolonialism" have been used to combat resistance activities. There is no indication that the ROK aid to active North Korean resisters has been effective.

EMIGRE ORGANZIATIONS

6. After the establishment of a Communist regime in North Korea, anti-Communist elements fled south. One sizeable group formed a northwestern Young Men's Association, which was absorbed by the ROK "Taehan Youth Corps" until it was assimilated into the South Korean Armed Forces. Many of

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this group were either Christians or followers of the Chondokyo Church (an indigenous church strong in the northwestern areas of Korea). These two groups had a background of active resistance against the Japanese. Many thousands of their number were used as guerrilla forces by the UN Command during the Korean War. Several smaller groups, cultural and political emigres, chief among which are the remnants of the Korean Democratic Party, led resistance against the Communists prior to the outbreak of the war. There are no current indications of guidance or assistance to resistance elements in North Korea except that given by the ROK itself, nor is there adequate information on the contacts, if any, made by the ROK.

RESISTANCE POTENTIAL UNDER COLD WAR CONDITIONS

7. Assuming continuation of the armistice, resistance in North Korea is unlikely to be of much significance. At best, it may provide a limited source of intelligence. The security forces and the army are capable of dealing with any opposition, whether from disgruntled peasants, Christian elements, or survivors of the domestic purges. Even though the topography of the country, the vulnerability of the North Korean transportation system, and the homogeneity of the Korean people (which facilitates ROK infiltration) would favor guerrilla activities, the regime is considered capable of coping with them. It would have the support of nearby Soviet and Communist Chinese forces if it could not carry out the task alone.

RESISTANCE POTENTIAL UNDER WARTIME CONDITIONS

8. Under conditions of open war, North Korean resistance potential would probably increase somewhat but would probably be limited to isolated instances of sabotage, some passive resistance and defections, assistance to anti-Communist personnel in evasion and escape operations, and some intelligence collection. Increased security measures and support by the USSR and Communist China would make organized resistance virtually impossible. In the event of a Bloc defeat or a major retreat of the Communist forces in Korea, the populace still behind Communist lines might be encouraged to resist their oppressors. While such resistance would be an additional burden on the Communists, it is unlikely to be a decisive factor.

9. The responsibility for initiation of hostilities would not significantly affect resistance potential. The nationality of any allied forces invading North Korea also would not matter provided that no Japanese forces were employed. Unless political conditions in the ROK deteriorate sharply, the ROK would have no difficulty in establishing governmental institutions in North Korea which would have the initial support or acquiescence of the bulk of the population.

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